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jumps between two states. The generalized Keynes-Ramsey rule includes a precautionary 
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Uncertain labour income is a fact of life. In its simplest conceptual representation,
labour income moves stochastically between two states, high and low. Implications
of uncertain labour income are often analyzed in continuous-time setups. This is
true for search and matching models ￿ la Pissarides (1985), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and their many applications. They include the
analyses e.g. of business cycles as in Shimer (2005), of the e⁄ect of match and search
frictions on wage distributions as in Moscarini (2005), of mismatch as in Shimer (2007)
and of the e¢ ciency of various wage setting mechanisms as in Gautier et al. (2010).
It is standard practice in this literature (for some exceptions see below) to assume
strong capital market imperfections implying that households consume their current
income. Any labour market transition associated with a labour income jump therefore
implies a consumption jump ￿as a result, consumption is much more volatile than in
the data. If households were allowed to save, however, they could smooth consumption
and would generally self-insure against consumption ￿ uctuations by accumulating
wealth. It can be argued that analysing labour market issues without savings is a
shortcoming also for many other reasons. One can expect that bargaining and labour
supply choices are a⁄ected by personal wealth. Analysing the e⁄ects of labour market
policies is probably biased as well if wealth is not taken into account as wealth should
also a⁄ect search intensity. In ongoing numerical work, we ￿nd that unemployment
bene￿t levels have a strong e⁄ect on the distribution of wealth, especially at the lower
end. Finally, any normative analysis of optimal unemployment bene￿t schemes should
also take wealth issues into account as social welfare functions or other optimality
criteria neglecting wealth tend to be incomplete from a conceptional perspective.
It is the objective of this paper to introduce saving into a matching framework
in continuous time. The reason for choosing a continuous-time setup is three-fold.
First, a large part of the search and matching literature is in continuous time. It is an
advantage if the insights and modelling techniques from this literature can be used
with savings as well. Second, there is a rich set of tools available for continuous-time
uncertainty which can easily be applied to a matching and saving setup. Finally,
continuous-time models generally allow to push the analytical frontier a bit further
than discrete time models. More economic intuition can be gained when working e.g.
with phase diagrams than when working with abstract concepts only.
The ￿rst step in our analysis consists in presenting and solving the maximization
problem an individual faces where labour income jumps between two states. For sim-
plicity and in the tradition of this literature, these states are called employment and
unemployment even though it could also re￿ ect periods of high and low income. The
solution of this maximization problem is described by a generalized Keynes-Ramsey
rule where the generalization consists in a precautionary savings term. This term
lends itself to intuitive economic interpretation. The Keynes-Ramsey rule provides
simple conditions under which there will be (i) consumption and wealth growth in
both labour market states, (ii) growth for the employed and decline for the unem-
ployed workers or (iii) decline of consumption and wealth in both labour market
states.
2In a second step, we provide a phase-diagram analysis of the optimal behaviour
of an individual, i.e. of the evolution of wealth and consumption when labour income
jumps between being high and low. We can undertake a phase-diagram analysis
as in continuous-time deterministic setups as systems with Poisson-uncertainty are
piecewise-deterministic systems: between jumps, the system evolves on continuous
and di⁄erentiable trajectories.
As always, a unique solution to a di⁄erential equation system requires as many
boundary conditions as di⁄erential equations. We derive a boundary condition from
borrowing and lending considerations which implies that the highest debt an unem-
ployed worker can ever have is the present value of in￿nite unemployment bene￿ts.
This is the lower limit which is hit by an unemployed worker who dissaves. Once
this limit is reached, consumption of the unemployed worker is zero and will remain
zero until he ￿nds a new job. Using this boundary condition, the existence of optimal
consumption-wealth pro￿les for both labour market states can be proven.
The third step then asks the natural question about the distribution of wealth
and labour market status. Using the Dynkin formula, we obtain the Fokker-Planck
equations for the wealth-employment status system. We obtain a two-dimensional
partial di⁄erential equation system. It describes the evolution of the density of wealth
and employment status over time, given some initial condition. When we are inter-
ested in long-run properties only, we can set time derivatives equal to zero in the
Fokker-Planck equations and obtain an ordinary two-dimensional non-autonomous
di⁄erential equation system. Boundary conditions can be motivated from our phase
diagram analysis. Existence and uniqueness of a stationary long-run distribution of
wealth and labour market status and convergence to this long-run distribution can
be proven by building on Meyn and Tweedie (1993).
Most of these steps were obtained by assuming an exogenous interest and wage
rate. As we want to obtain a true general equilibrium solution, we then close the
model by looking at the aggregate distribution of wealth. This allows us to determine
an endogenous average wealth level plus an endogenous interest and wage rate.
The conceptional challenges provided by allowing for savings in a matching frame-
work in continuous time are fascinating. In order to focus on these challenges, we
remove all features from the standard Pissarides-type matching model which are not
essential for understanding saving decisions in such a setup. We therefore work with
an island-matching setup in the spirit of Lucas and Prescott (1974) where the wage
is competitive. Put simply, we end up with a continuous-time version of Aiyagari
(1994), i.e. a decentralized stochastic growth model with uncertainty in the labour
income process but aggregate certainty. The focus on island-matching allows us to
neglect wage-bargaining issues and the determination of the number of vacancies.
Compared to the challenges overcome in our paper, an extension for wage bargain-
ing and an endogenous number of vacancies is relatively straightforward and left for
future work.
This paper is related to various strands of the literature. There is a long literature
that looks at the e⁄ects of labour income uncertainty which is at least partially
uninsurable. In a growth model context, one can then ask ￿inter alia ￿whether
the implied precautionary savings yield a higher per capita capital stock (Huggett,
31993; Aiyagari, 1994; Huggett and Ospina, 2001; Marcet et al., 2007). In a matching
setup, savings have been analyzed in the literature starting with Andolfatto (1996)
and Merz (1995). In these setups, individuals are fully insured against labour income
risk as labour income is pooled in large families. Papers which exploit the advantage
of CARA (constant absolute risk aversion) utility functions to jointly analyse saving
and matching include Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), Hassler et al. (2005), Shimer and
Werning, (2007, 2008) and Hassler and Rodriguez Mora (1999, 2008). These papers
often work with closed-form solutions for the consumption-saving decision but cannot
always rule out negative consumption levels for poor households.
More recently, a series of papers (Lentz and Tranaes, 2005; Lentz, 2009; Bils et al.,
2007, 2009; Nakajima, 2008; Krusell et al., 2008, 2010) allows for individual labour
income uncertainty in the presence of saving and search or matching and a CRRA
(constant relative risk aversion) utility function. Some of them are not fully general
equilibrium as wages are exogenous (Lentz and Tranaes, 2005; Lentz, 2009) or as
a small open economy with an exogenous interest rate (but allowing for vacancies,
bargaining and match-speci￿c stochastic output) is considered (Bils et al., 2007, 2009).
Others are very similar to our setup as they assume competitive wage setting as well
(e.g. Krusell et al., 2008),2 some go beyond our setup and allow for vacancy creation
and Nash bargaining where the distribution of wealth implies a distribution of wages
(Krusell et al., 2010). All of these models are in discrete time.
Compared to these search, matching and saving models, the main di⁄erence of the
present paper lies in our strong analytical focus. We aim at characterizing equilibrium
properties as much as possible from an analytical perspective. The Keynes-Ramsey
rules (the Euler equations) reveal a lot of economic information inter alia on wealth
threshold levels crucial for understanding consumption and wealth dynamics. The
condition the interest rate has to satisfy such that a stationary general equilibrium
consists can easily be seen. The phase diagram analysis illustrates consumption,
wealth and employment dynamics in a very clear way. The description of distributions
by di⁄erential equations allows ￿once solved numerically ￿to obtain distributional
information more quickly than through simulations.3
Technically, this paper builds on earlier work of one of the authors (W￿lde, 1999,
2005) who analyzes optimal saving under Poisson uncertainty a⁄ecting the return to
capital but not labour income.4 We also use the insights of the long literature on
optimal saving under uncertainty in continuous time. Starting with Merton (1969),
it includes Turnovsky and Smith (2006), Guo et al. (2005), Bertola et al. (2005),
Hassler et al. (2005), Shimer and Werning, (2007, 2008) and Hassler and Rodriguez
Mora, 1999, 2008).
2The structure of our model di⁄ers slightly as we allow individuals to borrow.
3The latter would eventually provide a background for structural estimation as is typical for the
empirical search and matching literature (van den Berg, 1990; Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002; Flinn,
2006; see also Launov and W￿lde, 2010).
4Work completed before the present paper includes an unpublished PhD dissertation by Sen-
newald (2006) supervised by one of the authors which contains the Keynes-Ramsey rules. Toche
(2005) considers the saving problem of an individual where job-loss is permanent and unemployment
bene￿ts are zero. Lise (2006) developed a Keynes-Ramsey rule for times between jumps as well.
4The papers which are methodologically closest to ours are Shimer and Werning
(2007, 2008) and Lise (2007). Shimer and Werning analyse unemployment insurance
policies in a setup with job arrivals, deterministic or stochastic job duration and indi-
vidual savings under constant absolute risk aversion. CARA preferences allow them
to derive closed-form solutions which, however, cannot be obtained for constant rel-
ative risk aversion as used here. Lise (2007) derives a deterministic Keynes-Ramsey
rule (i.e. for periods between labour market transitions) similar to the one here for
employed workers in a model with on-the-job search and ￿rm heterogeneity. He ab-
stracts from general equilibrium considerations and does not provide formal existence
proofs.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section
3 derives implications of optimal behaviour. Section 4 presents the phase diagram
analysis to understand consumption-wealth patterns over time and across labour mar-
ket states. The existence result for optimal consumption rules is stated. Section 5
describes the joint distribution of the labour market status and wealth of one individ-
ual. The corresponding Fokker-Planck equations are introduced, boundary conditions
are discussed and uniqueness and convergence results are stated. Section 6 shows how
to obtain the aggregate distribution of wealth and how to formulate appropriate ini-
tial distributions. This allows to link macro to micro features of the model and to
de￿ne general equilibrium. The ￿nal section concludes. To save on space, all proofs
are in the companion papers by Bayer and W￿lde (2010a,b).
2 The model
We consider a model where all aggregate variables are in a steady state. At the micro
level, individuals face idiosyncratic uninsurable risk and variables evolve in a dynamic
and stochastic way.
2.1 Technologies
The production of output requires capital K and labour L. Both the capital stock and
employment are endogenous but constant. The technology is given by Y = Y (K;L)
and Y (:) has the usual neoclassical properties.
z (t) w b
￿(z (t)) 0 ￿ > 0
s(z (t)) s > 0 0
Table 1 State dependent arrival rates
As is common for Mortensen-Pissarides type search and matching models, the
employment status z (t) of any individual jumps between the state of employment,
w, and unemployment, b, with corresponding labour income w ￿the net wage ￿and
unemployment bene￿ts b. As an individual cannot lose her job when she does not
have one and as ￿nding a job makes (in the absence of on-the-job search) no sense
5for someone who has a job, both the job arrival rate ￿(z (t)) and the separation
rate s(z (t)) are state dependent. As an example, when an individual is employed,
￿(w) = 0, when she is unemployed, s(b) = 0:
The process z (t) can be viewed as a continuous-time Markov chain with state
space fw;bg: This Markov-chain view will be used further below for the derivation
of the Fokker-Planck equations describing the distributional properties of wealth and
employment status. For our analysis of the saving problem of the household, it is
most convenient to describe the related labour income process z (t) by a stochastic
di⁄erential equation,
dz (t) = ￿dq￿ ￿ ￿dqs; ￿ ￿ w ￿ b: (1)
The Poisson process qs counts how often our individual moves from employment into
unemployment. The arrival rate of this process is given by s(z (t)). The Poisson
process related to job ￿nding is denoted by q￿ with an arrival rate ￿(z (t)). It counts
how often the individual ￿nds a job.
When the individual is employed, z (t) = w; the employment equation (1) simpli-
￿es to dw = ￿(w ￿ b)dqs: Whenever the process qs jumps, i.e. when the individual
loses her job and dqs = 1, the change in labour income is given by ￿w +b and, given
that the individual earns w before losing the job, earns w ￿ w + b = b afterwards.
Similarly, when unemployed, the employment status follows db = (w ￿ b)dq￿ and
￿nding a job, i.e. dq￿ = 1; means that labour income increases from b to w.
2.2 Households and government
Each individual can save in an asset a (which is capital used by ￿rms). Her budget
constraint reads
da(t) = fra(t) + z (t) ￿ c(t)gdt: (2)
Per unit of time dt wealth a(t) increases (or decreases) if capital income ra(t) plus
labour income z (t) is larger (or smaller) than consumption c(t): Following (1), labour
income z (t) is given either by w or b. Dividing the budget constraint by dt and using
_ a(t) ￿ da(t)=dt would yield a more standard expression, _ a(t) = ra(t) + z (t) ￿
c(t): As a(t) is not di⁄erentiable with respect to time at moments where individuals
jump between employment and unemployment (or vice versa), we prefer the above
representation. The latter is also more consistent with (1).
The objective function of the individual is a standard intertemporal utility func-
tion,





where expectations need to be formed due to the uncertainty of labour income which
in turn makes consumption c(￿) uncertain.5 The expectations operator is Et and
conditions on the current state in t: The planning horizon starts in t and is in￿nite.
The time preference rate ￿ is positive.
5The notation c(￿) is not entirely correct. When solving the maximization problem below,
consumption will be considered to be a function of current state variables.
6Even though most of our results should hold for general instantaneous utility










￿ 6= 1 and ￿ > 0;
￿ = 1: (4)
All proofs will use the speci￿cation for a positive ￿ 6= 1: The log case is not proven.
There is a government who can tax the gross wage w=(1 ￿ ￿) using a proportional
tax ￿. Tax income from employed workers is used to ￿nance unemployment bene￿ts




L = b[N ￿ L] (5)
is ful￿lled at each point in time. The path of bene￿ts b is determined by some political
process which is exogenous to this model. This process makes sure that bene￿ts are
smaller than the net wage, b < w.
2.3 Endowment
The workforce of this economy has an exogenous and invariant size N: Individuals
are initially endowed with wealth ai (t): This can be a ￿xed number or random (see




Given our steady state setup, the aggregate capital stock K is endogenous but con-
stant. Loosely speaking, there is a very large number of agents i such that all dy-
namics at the individual level wash out at the aggregate level. See our de￿nition of
an equilibrium below ￿especially (31) ￿for a precise formulation.
Given the job separation and matching setup, it is well-known that in a steady
state, aggregate employment is an increasing function of the matching and a decreas-







For our understanding of optimal consumption behaviour, it is useful to derive a
Keynes-Ramsey rule. We extend the approach suggested by W￿lde (1999, 2008) for
the case of an uncertain interest rate to our case of uncertain labour income. We
7suppress the time argument for readability. Consumption c(aw;w) of an employed
















[c(aw;b) ￿ c(aw;w)]dqs (8)
while her wealth evolves according to (2) with z = w, i.e.
daw = [raw + w ￿ c(aw;w)]dt: (9)
Analogously, solving for the optimal consumption of an unemployed individual with
















[c(ab;w) ￿ c(ab;b)]dq￿ (10)
and her wealth follows
dab = [rab + b ￿ c(ab;b)]dt: (11)
Without uncertainty about future labor income, i.e. s = ￿ = dqs = dq￿ = 0, the
above Keynes-Ramsey rules reduce to the classical deterministic consumption rule,
￿
u00(c)
u0(c) _ c = r ￿ ￿. The additional s[:] term in (8) shows that consumption growth is
faster under the risk of a job loss. Note that the expression [u0 (c(aw;b))=u0 (c(aw;w)) ￿ 1]
is positive as consumption c(aw;b) of an unemployed worker is smaller than consump-
tion of an employed worker c(aw;w) (this is proven in Bayer and W￿lde, 2010a, lem. 8)
and marginal utility is decreasing, u00 < 0: Similarly, the ￿[:] term in (10) shows that
consumption growth for unemployed workers is smaller.
As the additional term in (8) contains the ratio of marginal utility from con-
sumption when unemployed relative to marginal utility when employed, this suggests
that it stands for precautionary savings (Leland, 1968, Aiyagari, 1994, Huggett and
Ospina, 2001). When marginal utility from consumption under unemployment is
much higher than marginal utility from employment, individuals experience a high
drop in consumption when becoming unemployed. If relative consumption shrinks as
wealth rises, i.e. if d
da
c(a;w)
c(a;b) < 0; reducing this gap and smoothing consumption is best
achieved by fast capital accumulation. This fast capital accumulation would go hand
in hand with fast consumption growth as visible in (8).
In the case of unemployment, the ￿[:] term in (10) suggests that the possibility to
￿nd a new job induces unemployed individuals to increase their current consumption
level. Relative to a situation in which unemployment is an absorbing state (once
unemployed, always unemployed, i.e. ￿ = 0), the prospect of a higher labor income
in the future reduces the willingness to give up today￿ s consumption. With higher
consumption levels, wealth accumulation is lower and consumption growth is reduced.
The stochastic dq-terms in (8) and (10) (tautologically) represent the discrete
jumps in the level of consumption whenever the employment status changes. We will
understand more about these jumps after the phase-diagram analysis below.
83.2 Factor rewards
Workers ￿nd markets (￿islands￿ ) with an in￿nite supply of jobs with arrival rates ￿:
Once a market is found, there is perfect competition and factor rewards are given by
marginal productivities as in Lucas and Prescott (1974). Firms rent capital on a spot
market and choose an amount such that marginal productivity equals the rental rate.











4 Consumption and wealth dynamics
This section characterizes consumption and wealth properties under optimal behav-
iour, taking factor rewards as given. We will return to endogenous factor rewards and
thereby to general equilibrium in sect. 6.
4.1 Consumption growth and the interest rate
We ￿rst focus on individuals in periods between jumps. The evolution of consumption
is then given by the deterministic part, i.e. the dt-part, in (8) and (10). We then easily
understand
Lemma 1 Individual consumption rises if and only if current consumption relative
to consumption in the other state is su¢ ciently high.
For the employed worker, consumption rises if and only if c(aw;w) relative to





















For the unemployed worker, consumption rises if and only if c(ab;b) relative to



















Proof. Rearranging (8) and (10) for dqs = dq￿ = 0 and taking (4) into account
gives the results (see app. A.2). Note that in what follows   will be used only for r
su¢ ciently small making sure that   is a real number.
We can now establish our ￿rst main ￿ndings. As the conditions in lem. 1 show,
consumption and wealth dynamics crucially depend on how high the interest rate is.
We therefore subdivide our discussion into three parts with r lying in the three ranges
given by (0;￿]; (￿;￿ + ￿); [￿ + ￿;1): For the proofs of all of our results, we rely on
one very weak
9Assumption 1 Relative consumption c(a;w)=c(a;b) is continuously di⁄erentiable
in wealth a: The number of sign changes of its ￿rst derivative with respect to wealth
in any interval of ￿nite length is ￿nite.6
Starting with the third range [￿ + ￿;1), we obtain
Proposition 1 For a high interest rate, i.e. if r ￿ ￿ + ￿, consumption of employed
and unemployed workers always increases.
Proof. Consumption of the employed worker increases as can be directly seen
from the ￿rst expression in (13). As long as r > ￿ and c(a;w) > c(a;b); the latter is
proven in Bayer and W￿lde (2010a, lem. 8), condition (13) is ful￿lled: The right-hand
side (RHS) is smaller than one and the left-hand side is larger than one as long as
u00 < 0 which holds for (4). The case of the unemployed worker can also most easily
be seen from the ￿rst expression in (15). For r = ￿ + ￿ + " with " ￿ 0; the RHS is
given by 1 ￿
r￿￿
￿ = ￿ "
￿ ￿ 0: As
u0(c(ab;w))
u0(c(ab;b)) ￿ 0; (15) holds for r ￿ ￿ + ￿.
The high interest rate case reminds of the standard optimal saving result in de-
terministic setups. If the interest rate is only high enough, consumption and wealth
increase over time. This is true here as well. The only di⁄erence consists in the fact
that the interest rate must be higher than the time preference rate plus the job arrival
rate.
While we leave a quantitative analysis to ongoing numerical work, it is interesting
already at this stage to note that the di⁄erence for the interest rate as compared to
deterministic models is quite substantial. In deterministic models, the interest rate
must be larger than the time preference rate. As the job arrival rate is around four
times higher than the time preference rate, the interest rate must be much higher
here to guarantee wealth growth in all employment states.
As in other setups with growing consumption, we need to make sure that con-
sumption does not grow too fast. If it does, utility grows too fast and the expected
value of the integral in the objective function (3) is not ￿nite. Optimization would
then be more involved, which we would like to avoid. We therefore have to impose a
boundedness condition which implies an upper limit on the interest rate. This con-
dition can easily be derived for the limiting case where a is very large, i.e. where the
di⁄erence between w and b can be neglected. The boundedness condition then reads
(1 ￿ ￿)r < ￿:7
The second result is summarized in
Proposition 2 If the interest rate is at an intermediate level, i.e. ￿ < r < ￿ + ￿,
(i) consumption of employed workers always increases.
6The second sentence of this assumption is required to rule out ￿pathological cases￿ . One can
construct continuously di⁄erentiable functions that change sign in￿nitly often in a ￿nite neighbor-
hood (think of xsin(1=x) in a neighborhood of zero). None of these functions would be economically
plausible in any way. This second sentence is used in the proof of prop. 4.
7An interest rate r can satisfy both this boundedness condition and the condition r ￿ ￿ + ￿ for
the high-interest-rate case if ￿ < ￿
1￿￿￿. This condition on ￿ needs to be taken into account in any
quantitative analysis.
10(ii) consumption of an unemployed worker increases only if she is su¢ ciently
wealthy, i.e. if her wealth a exceeds the threshold level a￿










Consumption decreases for a < a￿
b:
(iii) At the threshold level a￿
b; consumption of employed workers exceeds consump-
tion of unemployed workers.
Proof. The proof is in complete analogy to the proof of the following prop. 3 for
the low interest rate. As prop. 3 is more important for our purposes, we will prove
prop. 3 but not this one.
This proposition points to the central new insight for optimal consumption. For
the employed worker, the result from deterministic worlds survives: If the interest
rate is higher than the time preference rate, consumption and wealth rise. For the
unemployed worker, however, this is not true. Consumption and wealth rise only if
the unemployed worker is su¢ ciently rich. In a way, this is a ￿dramatic￿result. If
a worker loses a job, consumption continues to rise only if the worker is su¢ ciently
rich at the moment of the job loss. If, by contrast, a worker losing a job is below the
threshold level a￿
b; consumption and wealth is reduced.8
Finally, we have











For our instantaneous utility function (4), this de￿nition reads
c(a
￿
w;b) =  c(a
￿
w;w) (18)
where   is from (14).
(i) Consumption of employed workers increases if the worker owns a su¢ ciently
low wealth level, a < a￿
w. Employed workers with a > a￿
w choose falling consumption
paths.
(ii) Consumption of unemployed workers always decreases.
(iii) Consumption of employed workers exceeds consumption of unemployed work-
ers at the threshold a￿
w; i.e.   ￿ 1 in (18) for r ￿ ￿:
Proof. see Bayer and W￿lde (2010a).
We are now in a position to intuitively understand all three propositions. In deter-
ministic setups, an interest rate exceeding the time preference rate is enough to imply
positive consumption growth. In a world with precautionary saving, only employed
workers will experience rising consumption for sure when r > ￿: Unemployed workers
8See an earlier version of this paper (Bayer and W￿lde, 2009) for a phase diagram illustration of
this proposition.
11experience rising consumption only for a high interest rate r > ￿+￿ or for r close to
but larger than ￿ only if they are su¢ ciently rich. The reason for these results is the
￿optimism￿of unemployed workers that they will ￿nd a job in the future. Anticipat-
ing higher future income, they choose a higher consumption level than in a situation
where the state of unemployment is permanent. Due to this higher consumption level,
consumption and wealth growth is reduced. Only if the interest rate exceeds ￿+￿ or
if an unemployed worker is su¢ ciently rich, this higher consumption does still allow
for consumption growth.
Similarly for employed workers: In deterministic worlds, an interest rate below
the time preference rate implies falling consumption and wealth levels. Here, as there
is precautionary saving of the employed worker, a situation of r < ￿ still implies
growing consumption and wealth.
These propositions also clearly show that if we are interested in a general equi-
librium result with stationary properties, the interest rate cannot be larger than the
time preference rate. If the interest rate exceeded the time preference rate, consump-
tion would grow without bound ￿at least for some employment states and levels
of wealth. Only for r ￿ ￿ there are consumption dynamics which indicate that a
stationary distribution of consumption can exist.
4.2 The reduced form
Before we can derive further properties of optimal behaviour, we need a ￿reduced
form￿for optimal behaviour of individuals. A reduced form is a system of equations
with as few equations as possible which determines an identical number of endogenous
variables and which allow us to derive all other endogenous variables subsequently.
When searching for such a reduced form, we can exploit the fact that Poisson uncer-
tainty allows to divide the analysis of a system into what happens between jumps and
what happens at jumps. Between jumps, the system evolves in a deterministic way ￿
but does of course take the possibility of a jump into account as is clearly visible in
the precautionary savings terms in the Keynes-Ramsey rules (8) and (10).9
We obtain such a reduced form by focusing on the evolution between jumps and
by eliminating time as exogenous variable. Computing the derivatives of consump-
tion with respect to wealth in both states and considering wealth as the exogenous
variable, we obtain a two-dimensional system of non-autonomous ordinary di⁄erential
equations (ODE). As wealth is now the argument for these two di⁄erential equations,
there is no longer a need to distinguish between wealth of employed and unemployed
workers (i.e. between aw and ab). We simply ask how wealth changes in one or the
9One could be tempted to think of the deterministic parts of the two Keynes-Ramsey rules (8)
and (10), jointly with the budget constraints (9) and (11) to provide such a reduced form. With
an initial condition for wealth and the consumption levels in the di⁄erent states, one could think
of the evolution between jumps as being described by four ordinary di⁄erential equations. When
solving these equations (conceptionally or numerically), the solution in t for consumption of, say,
the unemployed, c(ab;b) from (10) would not correspond to consumption c(aw;b) as required in
the precautionary savings part in (8) for the employed as wealth levels are accumulated at di⁄erent
speed, i.e. ab (t) generally di⁄ers from aw (t): Equations (8) to (11) do therefore not constitute a
system of ODEs and cannot be used as a reduced form.



























ra + b ￿ c(a;b)
: (19b)
With two boundary conditions, this system provides a unique solution for c(a;w)
and c(a;b). Once solved, the e⁄ect of a jump is then simply the e⁄ect of a jump of
consumption from, say, c(a;w) to c(a;b):
4.3 Phase diagram and policy functions
Given the ￿ndings on consumption in the above propositions and our reduced form
in (19), we can now describe the link between optimal consumption and wealth of
unemployed and employed workers. We will focus on the case of an interest rate below
the time preference rate as this is the endogenous property of a stationary general
equilibrium solution.10
￿ Natural borrowing limit
The subsequent analysis will be facilitated by noting that there is an endogenous
￿natural￿borrowing limit. The idea is similar to Aiyagari￿ s (1994) borrowing limit
resulting from non-negative consumption. This limit is derived in the following
Proposition 4 Any individual with initial wealth a ￿ ￿b=r will never be able to or
willing to borrow more than ￿b=r: Consumption of an unemployed worker at a = ￿b=r
is zero, c(￿b=r;b) = 0:
Proof. ￿willing to￿ : An employed individual with a ￿ ￿b=r will increase wealth
for any wealth levels below a￿
w from (17). If a￿
w is larger than ￿b=r ￿which we can
safely assume ￿employed workers with wealth below a￿
w increase wealth and are not
willing to borrow more than ￿b=r.
￿able to￿ : Imagine an unemployed worker had wealth lower than ￿b=r: Even if
consumption is equal to zero, wealth would further fall, given that _ a = ra + b < 0 ,
a < ￿b=r: If an individual could commit to zero consumption when employed and
if the separation rate was zero, the maximum debt an individual could pay back is
￿w=r: Imagine an unemployed worker succeeded in convincing someone to lend her
￿money￿even though current wealth is below ￿b=r: Then, with a strictly positive
probability, wealth will fall below ￿w=r within a ￿nite period of time. Hence, anyone
lending to an unemployed worker with wealth below ￿b=r knows that not all of this
loan will be paid back with positive probability. This cannot be the case in our setup
with one riskless asset. Hence, the maximum debt level is b=r and consumption is
zero at a = ￿b=r for an unemployed worker.
10See Bayer and W￿lde (2009) for more on the intermediate and high interest rate case.
13￿ Laws of motion and policy functions
The following ￿g. 1 plots wealth on the horizontal and consumption c(a;z) on
the vertical axis. It plots dashed zero-motion lines for aw and c(a;w) and a solid
zero-motion line for ab following from (9), (17) and (11), respectively. We assume
for this ￿gure that the threshold level a￿
w is positive.11 The intersection point of the






We call this point temporary steady state for two reasons. On the one hand, employed
workers experience no change in wealth, consumption or any other variable when at
this point (as in a standard steady state of a deterministic system). On the other hand,
the expected spell in employment is ￿nite and a random transition into unemployment
will eventually occur. Hence, the state in ￿ is steady only temporarily.
As we know from prop. 3 that consumption for the unemployed always falls, both
consumption and wealth fall above the zero-motion line for ab. The arrow-pairs for
the employed workers are also added. They show that one can draw a saddle-path
through the TSS. To the left of the TSS, wealth and consumption of employed workers
rise, to the right, they fall.
Figure 1 Policy functions for employed and unemployed workers (low interest rate)
Relative consumption when the employed worker is in the TSS is given by (18). A
trajectory going through (a￿
w;c(a￿
w;b)) and hitting the zero-motion line of ab at ￿b=r
is in accordance with laws of motions for the unemployed worker.
￿ Properties of optimal behaviour
11This is of course a quantitative issue. In ongoing numerical work, the threshold is positive for
reasonable parameter values. It approaches in￿nity for r approaching ￿.
14The case of a low interest rate is particularly useful as the range of wealth a worker
can hold is bounded. Whatever the initial wealth level, there is a positive probability
that the wealth level will be in the range [￿b=r;a￿
w] after some ￿nite length of time.
For an illustration, consider the policy functions in ￿g. 1: Wealth decreases both
for employed and unemployed workers for a > a￿
w: The transition into the range
[￿b=r;a￿
w] will take place only in the state of unemployment which, however, occurs
with positive probability.
When wealth of an individual is within the range [￿b=r;a￿
w]; consumption and
wealth will rise while employed and fall while unemployed. While employed, precau-
tionary saving motives drive the worker to accumulate wealth. While unemployed,
the worker runs down current wealth as higher income for the future is anticipated ￿
￿postcautionary dissaving￿takes place. When a worker loses a job at a wealth level
of, say, a￿
w=2; his consumption level will drop from c(a￿
w=2;w) to c(a￿
w=2;b): Con-
versely, if an unemployed worker ￿nds a job at, say, a = 0; her consumption increases
from c(0;b) to c(0;w): A worker will therefore be in a permanent consumption and
wealth cycle. Given these dynamics, one can easily imagine a distribution of wealth
over the range [￿b=r;a￿
w].
4.4 Existence of equilibrium
All steps undertaken so far were explorative. We now turn to a proof for the existence
of a path c(a;z) as depicted in ￿g. 1.
In ￿g. 1, we implicitly considered solutions of our systemin the set Q = fa ￿ ￿b=rg\
fc(a;w) ￿ ra + wg\fc(a;b) ￿ ra + bg\fc(a;b) ￿ 0g\fc(a;w) ￿ c(a;b)g. In words,
wealth is at least as large as the maximum debt level b=r; consumption of the employed
worker is below the zero-motion line for her wealth, consumption of the unemployed
worker is above her zero-motion line for wealth, consumption of the unemployed
worker is non-negative and consumption of employed workers always exceeds con-
sumption of unemployed workers (the latter is proven in Bayer and W￿lde, 2010a,




3j(a;c(a;w);c(a;b)) 2 Q; (21)
c(a;w) ￿ ￿ < 1; a ￿ (c(a;w) ￿ w + v)=rg;
where ￿ is a ￿nite large constant. There are two di⁄erences to Q : First, the set Rv;￿
is bounded. This is a purely technical necessity. Second, the set Rv;￿ excludes the
zero-motion line for wealth aw by subtracting a small positive number v. We need to
do this as the fraction on the right-hand side of our di⁄erential equation (19a) is not
de￿ned for the TSS.12
We now introduce an auxiliary TSS (aTSS) in order to capture v: In analogy to






12While this is a standard property of many steady states, the standard solutions (e.g. linearization
around the steady state) do not work in our case. This is in part due to the fact that the original
stochastic di⁄erential equation system (8) to (11) - even when stripped of its stochastic part - is not
an ordinary di⁄erential equation system.
15i.e. the wealth level a￿
w is unchanged but the consumption level is ￿a bit lower￿than in
the TSS. In the TSS, the consumption level is on the zero-motion line, i.e. c(a￿
w;w) =
ra￿
w + w: In the aTSS, the consumption level is on the line ra + w ￿ v and therefore
given by cv (a￿
w;w) = ra￿
w + w ￿ v: Let us now consider the following
De￿nition 1 (Optimal consumption path) A consumption path is a solution (a;c(a;w);c(a;b))
of the ODE-system (19) for the range ￿b=r ￿ a ￿ a￿




w;b)). In analogy to the aTSS and to (18), the terminal condi-
tion satis￿es cv (a￿
w;w) = ra￿
w + w ￿ v and cv (a￿
w;b) =  cv (a￿
w;w) for an arbitrary
a￿
w > ￿b=r: An optimal consumption path is a consumption path which in addition
satis￿es c(￿b=r;b) = 0:
Bayer and W￿lde (2010a) then prove
Theorem 1 There is an optimal consumption path.
This establishes that we can continue in our analysis by taking the existence of
a path c(a;z) as given. Intuitively speaking, i.e. looking at v as very small con-
stant close to zero, we know that there are paths c(a;w) and c(a;b) as drawn in
￿g. 1. The approximation implied by the auxiliary TSS is very small compared to
any measurement error in the data. Values of v = 10￿3 worked perfectly in numerical
solutions.13
5 The distribution of labour income and wealth
Let us now describe distributional properties of z (t) and a(t): This is of importance
per se from a micro perspective ￿but it will also allow us to close the model and
obtain general equilibrium results.
5.1 Labour market probabilities
Consider ￿rst the distribution of the labour market state. Given that the transition
rates between w and b are constant, the conditional probabilities of being in state z (￿)
follow e.g. from solving Kolmogorov￿ s backward equations as presented e.g. in Ross
(1993, ch. 6). As an example, the probability of being employed in ￿ ￿ t conditional
on being in state z 2 fw;bg in t are
















13Working on the existence proof made clear that one cannot easily prove uniqueness. Ongoing
numerical work indicates that the maximized Bellman equation can be satis￿ed by two di⁄erent
value functions which imply large quantitative di⁄erences.
16The complementary probabilities are pwb (￿) = 1 ￿ pww (￿) and pbb (￿) = 1 ￿ pbw (￿):
Letting pw (t) denote the probability of z (t) = w; i.e. letting it describe the initial
distribution of z (t); the unconditional probability of being in state z in ￿ is
pz (￿) = pw (t)pwz (￿) + (1 ￿ pw (t))pbz (￿): (24)
5.2 Fokker-Planck equations for wealth
Now consider one individual with a level of wealth of a(t) and an employment status
z (t): This individual faces an uncertain future labour income stream z (￿): What is
the joint distribution of a(￿) and z (￿) for ￿ > t? Using methods well-established in
stochastics, we can compute the Fokker-Planck equations. They describe the evolu-
tion of the (joint) density of (a(￿);z (￿)); i.e. of the labour market status and wealth
for ￿ ￿ t: This density is denoted by p(a;z;￿) and obviously driven by a discrete
and a continuous random variable. We can therefore split it into two ￿subdensities￿
p(a;w;￿) and p(a;b;￿) which can be understood as the product of a conditional
probability times the probability of being in a certain employment state,
p(a;z;￿) ￿ p(a;￿jz)pz (￿): (25)
The probability pz (￿) of an individual to be in a state z in ￿ is given by (24). The






b or w p(a,w ,  )
p(a,b,  )
p(a,  ) t
t
t
Figure 2 The subdensities p(a;b;￿) and p(a;w;￿) and the density p(a;￿)
Note that the distribution of (a(￿);z (￿)) certainly depends on the initial con-
dition (a(t);z (t)), which needs to be speci￿ed in order to calculate p(a;z;￿). In
the notation we do not distinguish between the following two possibilities. Firstly,
(a(t);z (t)) can be deterministic numbers, in which case p(a;z;t) is a Dirac-distribution
centered in (a(t);z (t)) (more precisely, the mapping a ! p(z (t);a;t) is a Dirac-
distribution). Secondly, (a(t);z (t)) can itself be random, either because we regard
17them as outcomes of the employment-wealth-process started at an even earlier time, or
because there is some intrinsic uncertainty in measuring a(t) (see below in sect. 5.4).
As is clear from (25), p(a;z;￿) are not conditional densities ￿they rather integrate




p(a;￿jz)pz (￿)da = pz (￿)
Z
p(a;￿jz)da = pz (￿): (26)
The density of a at some point in time ￿ for of an individual with initial condition
(a(t);z (t)) is then simply
p(a;￿) = p(a;w;￿) + p(a;b;￿): (27)
Fig. 2 illustrates these (sub-) densities and how they qualitatively look like at an
arbitrary point in time ￿ ￿ t.14
The derivation of the Fokker-Planck equations is in Bayer and W￿lde (2010a).















p(a;w;￿) ￿ ￿p(a;b;￿) = 0; (28a)
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p(a;b;￿) ￿ sp(a;w;￿) = 0: (28b)
The di⁄erential equations are linear with derivatives in ￿ and a. They are non-
autonomous as coe¢ cients of the densities and their derivatives are functions of a.
As we can see, the density is linked to optimal behaviour through the consumption
levels c(a;w) and c(a;b) (and their partial derivatives, i.e. the marginal propensities
to consume out of wealth) obtained from the solution of the individual optimization
problem. The solution of (28) gives the density p(a;z;￿) for any a, z and ￿; i.e. the
adjustment process of the density is captured as well.
Compared to closed-form solutions for transition densities which are used in ￿-
nance (see e.g. A￿t-Sahalia, 2004), our di⁄erential equations are of course less infor-
mative. The closed form solutions build on linear stochastic di⁄erential equations,
however. The absence of a closed-form solution here is therefore simply the result of
the non-linearity of our optimal consumption functions c(a;z):
5.3 Existence and uniqueness of and convergence to a limit-
ing distribution
Let us ￿rst note that the limiting distribution for the employment status z (￿) can
easily be seen from (22) and (23) and their complementary probabilities. For any
14We should stress that even though we use the term density, p(a;z;￿) and p(a;￿) can contain
one or more mass-points. Our formal derivation covers these cases as well.
18￿xed initial condition z (t) 2 fw;bg; the limiting distribution for ￿ ! 1 is given by
p(w) = ￿=(￿ + s) and p(b) = s=(￿ + s): The same limiting distribution results if
the initial condition itself is a distribution.
The question of existence of and convergence to a limiting distribution for the joint
density p(a;z;￿) is far more involved. This question is of importance not only for
the model under consideration, it is related to many other stochastic growth models
in economics. We therefore state the central result here but refer the reader to a
companion paper (Bayer and W￿lde, 2010b) which treats this issue in much more
detail.
For our purposes here, let us introduce the notion of an invariant distribution. A
distribution for (a;z) is called invariant, if (a(￿);z (￿)) follows the distribution for
any time ￿ > t provided that (a(t);z (t)) does. Obviously, any limiting distribution
must be invariant. Building on the general ergodicity-theory for Markov-processes by
Down et al. (1995), we obtain
Theorem 2 (Bayer and W￿lde, 2010b) Let r < ￿ and assume there is a temporary
steady state (TSS), such that optimal consumption c(a;z) is continuously di⁄eren-
tiable in wealth a. Assume further that the initial distribution of wealth is supported
in [￿b=r;a￿
w]. Then,
(i) the distribution of wealth at any subsequent time ￿ ￿ t is supported in [￿b=r;a￿
w];
(ii) there is a unique invariant wealth distribution, and
(iii) for any such initial distribution, the distribution of wealth converges to the
invariant distribution.
Note that this theorem can be proven for the set R￿ only, i.e. the parameter v
from the set Rv;￿ in (21) used for the proof of theo. 1 must be zero. This proof
therefore requires the existence of a TSS and not of an auxiliary TSS. Note also that
if r > ￿, no invariant probability distribution and, hence, no limiting distribution
exists.
5.4 Some background for numerical solutions
￿ Initial conditions
Obtaining a unique solution for ODEs generally requires certain di⁄erentiability
conditions and as many initial conditions as di⁄erential equations. Conditions for
obtaining a unique solution for PDEs di⁄er in various respects, of which the most
important one from an intuitive perspective is the fact that instead of initial conditions
(i.e. an initial value or vector), initial functions are required. This can easily be
understood for our case: Let us assume two initial functions for a; one for each
labour market state z 2 fw;bg. The obvious interpretation for these initial functions
are densities, just as illustrated in ￿g. 2. Initial functions would therefore be given
by p(a;b;t) = pini (a;b) and p(a;w;t) = pini (a;w): Clearly, they take positive values
on the range [￿b=r;a￿
w] only and need to jointly integrate to unity. Given these initial
functions, one can then compute the partial derivatives with respect to a in (28).
19This gives an ODE system which allows us to compute the density for the ￿next￿￿:
Repeating this gives us the densities for all z; a and ￿ we are interested in.
An initial function for wealth in each labour market state sounds unusual when
thinking of one individual who, say, in t has wealth of a(t) and is currently employed,
z (t) = w: One can express these two deterministic numbers such that we obtain
initial functions, however. First, pini (a;b) = 0: as the probability for an employed




￿b=r pini (a;b)da (compare the example in (26)), pini (a;b) must be zero. Second,
there are two possibilities for pini (a;w): Either one considers pini (a;w) as a Dirac-
distribution, i.e. there is a degenerate density with mass-point at a = a(t): Or,
maybe most convenient both for numerical purposes and for intuition, one considers
the current wealth level a(t) to be observed with some imprecision. Pricing various
types of assets (cars or other durable consumption goods like a house) might not be
straightforward and one can easily imagine an initial function which is zero to the left
of amin and to the right of amax and condenses all probability between these values
(which can of course be arbitrarily close to a(t)).
￿ The long-run distribution of individual wealth
When we are interested in the long-run distribution of wealth and income only,
the time derivatives of the densities would be zero and the long-run densities would
be described by two linear ordinary di⁄erential equations,










p(a;w) ￿ ￿p(a;b) = 0;
(29a)










p(a;b) ￿ sp(a;w) = 0:
(29b)
The advantage of these two di⁄erential equation systems is clear: if numerical
procedures can be found to easily solve them, short-run and long-run distributions
can be obtained without having to simulate a system. These equations also open up
new avenues for structural estimation. Parameters can easily be estimated such that
an observed distribution is optimally ￿tted by these predicted distributions.
￿ Boundary conditions for the long-run distribution
For the long-run distribution in (29), we conjecture that two boundary conditions
can be described as follows. Let the bounds of the range of a be given by ￿b=r and
a￿
w as illustrated in ￿g. 1. Boundary conditions are then provided by
p(a
￿
w;w) = 0; p(a
￿
w;b) = 0: (30)
We do not provide a formal proof here but rather give the following intuitive
reasoning. We leave further investigation of both (29) and (28) to our ongoing work
20on the e⁄ect of labour market policies on wealth distributions. The intuition for
p(a￿
w;w) = 0 comes from the saddle-path nature of the TSS ￿ in (20): There is
one path going into ￿ from the left and one going into ￿ from the right and two
(not drawn) starting from ￿ and going North and South. In saddle-points of ODE
systems, one can prove by linearization around the ￿x point that local solutions of the
ODE approach the saddle point asymptotically. Linearization here is more involved
given the special structure of our system (see fn. 12). Assuming that the qualitative
properties of local behaviour are not a⁄ected by this structure, we would observe
asymptotic behaviour here as well and the TSS ￿ would actually never be reached:
p(a￿
w;w) = 0 would follow. The second boundary condition is then an immediate
consequence. As the state (a￿
w;b) can occur only through a transition from (a￿
w;w) but
the density at (a￿
w;w) is zero, p(a￿
w;b) = 0 as well.
6 Aggregate distributions and equilibrium
6.1 The aggregate distribution of wealth and employment
Using all the results we collected so far on individual behaviour, we are now in an
easy position to describe the aggregate distribution of wealth and employment. One
statistic one generally would like to understand is the share of the population which
has a wealth below a certain level. The population consists of N individuals. Wealth
and labour market status of an individual i is described by the density pi (a;z;￿) given
an initial condition (ai (t);zi (t)): The density of each single individual is described
by the PDEs in (28). The density of individual wealth (without taking the labour
market status into account) is pi (a;￿) from (27).
Now de￿ne the share of individuals in the entire population with wealth be-
low a certain level a at some point in time ￿ > t as H (a;￿) ￿ ￿N
i=1I (ai (￿))=N
where I (ai (￿)) is the indicator function taking a value of 1 if ai (￿) < a and 0
otherwise. As the ai (￿) are identically and independently distributed, the strong
law of large numbers holds and we obtain limN!1H (a;￿) =
R a
￿b=r p(x;￿)dx: In
words, the share of individuals in our population with wealth below a is given by
the probability that an individual has wealth below a.15 Computing the derivative of




￿b=r p(x;￿)dx = p(a;￿):
When we are interested in wealth distributions for each labour market status
individually, we can de￿ne H (a;z;￿) ￿ ￿N
i=1I (ai (￿);z (￿))=N where the indicator
function takes the value of one if ai (￿) < a and z (￿) = z: The density is then given
by h(a;z;￿) = p(a;z;￿):
15It is hard to imagine an economy with an in￿nite number of agents N: The alternative to this
discrete law of large numbers is to work with a continuum of agents of mass N: The concept of
in￿nity is then available by construction and laws of large numbers do not encounter the problem
of having to imagine what an in￿nite number of individuals mean. On the downside, one runs into
many well-known technical problems and, maybe more importantly, it might be just as di¢ cult to
imagine a continuum of individuals as an economy with an in￿nite number of inhabitants.
21As has been stressed in the discussion after (25), the initial condition (a(t);z (t))
can itself be random. This means that a solution of (28) with an initial distribution
for a and z capturing some real world distribution of wealth and employment status
provides a prediction how this aggregate distribution evolves over time. We describe
our initial conditions by two subdensities, one for employed individuals and one for
unemployed individuals, similar to the subdensities in (27),
h(a;w;t) = h
ini (a;w); h(a;b;t) = h
ini (a;b):
Empirical information needed to ￿nd plausible initial functions (or to estimate them)
is the distribution of wealth for employed and unemployed workers. If the share of
unemployed workers is x%, the density hini (a;w) must integrate to x/100, given the
property of the subdensity p(a;w;￿) as shown in (26). If one is primarily interested in
understanding the prediction for the aggregate distribution of wealth, any reasonable
functions with range [￿b=r;a￿
w] and satisfying (26) will do.
6.2 Equilibrium
We are now ￿nally able to de￿ne general equilibrium. There is a deterministic macro
level where all variables are constant. All uncertainty and all dynamics take place at
the micro level. The average capital stock (for N approaching in￿nity) is given by






This provides the link between the micro and macro level. We can now formulate
De￿nition 2 A competitive stationary equilibrium is described by a constant aggre-
gate capital stock K and employment level L, factor rewards w; r and the tax rate ￿;
two functions c(a;w) and c(a;b) and a wealth density p(a) such that
1. K satis￿es (31) and L is given by (7),
2. given exogenous bene￿ts b; the government budget constraint (5) and the ￿rst-
order condition for labour in (12) jointly ￿x the tax rate ￿ and wage rate w; the
interest rate r satis￿es the ￿rst-order condition for capital in (12),
3. the consumption functions c(a;z) satisfy the reduced form (19) plus two bound-
ary conditions of def. 1,
4. the density p(a) is given by (27) for ￿ ! 1 where p(a;w) and p(a;b) are the
solution to (29) with boundary conditions (30).
In addition to this macro equilibrium, each individual￿ s wealth distribution p(a;z;￿)
is described by the solution to (28).
227 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to extend the standard labour market matching model
by allowing individuals to save. Allowing for savings in standard matching and search
models is highly recommended given that individuals do self-insure in the presence of
uninsurable risk. Due to the continuous-time setup chosen here, various results could
be illustrated in an intuitive way.
The Keynes-Ramsey rule for this setup reveals that precautionary savings are at
work here. Consumption grows faster while employed (as compared to a situation
without labour income ￿ uctuations) and grows slower while unemployed. Di⁄erent
qualitative behaviour concerning consumption and wealth growth was discovered for
situations of a low, intermediate and high interest rate.
A phase-diagram analysis for the low-interest-rate case revealed consumption and
wealth cycles within an endogenous wealth range. The lower bound of the distribution
of wealth is given by minus the present value of permanent unemployment bene￿ts,
￿b=r, the maximum wealth level is given by some a￿
w which depends on fundamental
parameters of the model. In times of employment, consumption grows and wealth is
built up. In times of unemployment consumption and wealth falls. A theorem on the
existence of an optimal consumption path was stated.
The paper then derived the Fokker-Planck equations which describe the evolution
of the distribution of wealth and labour market status for each individual worker
starting from some initial condition. A result has been stated that there exists a
unique long-run distribution and that initial distributions converge to this long-run
distribution. The analysis of distributions of labour market status and wealth in an
economy with many agents has also been undertaken. Using a standard law of large
numbers, aggregate shares in the population can be linked to individual probabilities.
This allows to close the model and obtain general equilibrium results. The advantage
of using Fokker-Planck equations is very fast computation of densities. This should
make this approach very suitable for structural estimation.
A problem often encountered in structural estimation with micro data is the lack
of model guidance on how to control for aggregate time-series e⁄ects. Future work can
address this issues by ￿rst allowing for explicit transitional dynamics. This would re-
quire time varying factor rewards and thereby a generalization of the Keynes-Ramsey
rules and of the derivation of the Fokker-Planck equations. Eventually, one should
allow for aggregate stochastic disturbances. This would yield exciting and highly
promising new results opening up new avenues for estimation.
238 Appendix
Proofs are in Bayer and W￿lde (2010a,b). Appendices numbered A.1 and A.2 are
available upon request.
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